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On the Present of Democracy  
and the Future of Populism –  
Interview with Ives Mény
Apie demokratijos dabartį ir populizmo ateitį.  
Interviu su Ives Mény
Yves Mény is the President Emeritus of the European University Institute in Florence, 
Italy. He has also served as Chairman of the Executive Committee of the European 
Consortium for Political Research (ECPR) as well as on editorial boards of journals 
such as West European Politics, Journal of Common Market Studies, Federal and Re-
gional Studies and Journal of Public Policy among others. His main areas of expertise 
are comparative politics, public policy, European Union affairs, and political and ad-
ministrative institutions. Yves Mény is perhaps best known for his book Democracy 
and the Populist Challenge (2002), which he co-authored with Yves Surel. His other 
major publications include Challenges to Consensual Politics. Democracy, Identity, 
and Populist Protest in the Alpine Region (2005) (co-edited with Daniele Caramani), 
Government and Politics in Western Europe: Britain, France, Italy, Germany (1998), 
Remaking The Hexagon: The New France In The New Europe (1995) (co-authored with 
Gregory Flynn). 
The interview was conducted by Dominykas Kaminskas.
Professor, the first question I would like to ask is about the problem 
of trust in democracy. You mentioned in your presentation as well 
that you feel that the rise of populism is tied to the fact that people 
are trusting democracy less and less. Can you elaborate on this phe-
nomenon?
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Mény: You know, trust is an invisible ingredient in the machinery 
of democracy. It’s not something that you can codify; it’s not some-
thing that you can regulate, etc. It’s an attitude vis-a-vis the order – 
you accept to deal with the order in good faith. And it’s particularly 
true in the field of representation, if you are to accept that somebody 
speaks on your behalf, you have to trust them. What has occurred 
over the past 20 or 30 years is that a sharp contrast developed in 
political speech on one hand and the capacity of delivering what has 
been promised to the people, sharp contrast between what was an-
nounced and what was delivered. It did not so much result from the 
bad faith of politicians. In some cases the politicians obviously tend 
to exaggerate slightly, but they deliver. This contrast, this difference 
stems mainly from the fact that politicians do not realize that they do 
not have the capacity anymore to deliver as they used to. Before the 
Second World War you could have argued that a few democracies, 
which were in existence at the time, have all the cards in their hands. 
They were responsible for economic policy, social policy, monetary 
policy, trade policy and so on. So within the nation the politician 
could argue that he could deliver what has been promised – today it 
is not possible anymore.
So it is a question of diminishing political power?
Mény: The limitations of power derive from many, many differ-
ent causes – some are related to the increasing globalization. How-
ever, it’s also related to the equilibrium between markets and states. 
Markets are stronger than states. The states are limited by what con-
stituted their strengths before, that is frontiers. The frontiers were 
protecting the state within. Now that the markets cross over borders, 
the state has no possibility to intervene beyond its frontiers, except 
through cooperation, through trust. However, the international arena 
is constructed on the basis of Westphalian philosophy – every state 
is equal. Obviously, some are more equal than others, but even states 
which cannot do something, can impede others from doing something 
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or can create, for instance, rogue states, tiny states with a big advant-
age in the global system, because they can take advantage of their 
smallness by becoming fiscal havens or offering favourable legal sys-
tems. In a certain way, some small states, with the help of markets, 
are pushing aside big states. It is no accident that most of the interna-
tional holding companies have decided to host their headquarters in 
the Netherlands. The Netherlands is a country which offers the most 
favourable conditions for holding companies. In the United States 
for a long time the most favourable legal system within the country 
was Delaware, which served as a heaven for companies. So in a way 
we have to see the question in a dynamic way. These strategies create 
rather dramatic problems, but at the same time this dynamism of the 
system is part of this difference in equality. Similarity or equality 
can safeguard many values, but at the same time the system becomes 
static. Inequality creates dynamism, because inequality is contested, 
and this creates new opportunities.
We talked about power and yet somehow, especially in American 
academia, there is a lot of talk about discourse and whether or not 
this is not just an issue of distribution of resources and distribution of 
political power, but also of some people being unable to speak about 
certain things, such as migration. Would you agree that that has also 
contributed to the rise of populism and that some topics are just off 
the table for public discussion?
Mény: Well, call these kinds of reactions populist or not, but these 
kinds of reactions often occur or have occurred in closed systems. 
That is, the elites were interlocking. There were some forms of solid-
arity in order to exclude some issues or in order to remain in govern-
ment. For instance, Austria, before the rise of the populist movement, 
was a system where the Socialists on one hand and the Christian 
Democrats on the other governed the country for 50 years or more. 
These governments and the alternation of government between these 
forces meant that in Austria everybody had to be black or red – from 
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the shopkeeper to the elites, you had to be in one camp. One camp 
could move into power after the other, but at the same time the sys-
tem was completely frozen, because you had to be either Socialist 
or Christian Democrat. Some people wanted to be grey or pink, not 
red or black, and I think the biggest mistake, or one of the biggest 
mistakes of the Social Democratic parties or, let’s say, of the parties 
which are centre-right or centre-left, has been to avoid discussing hot 
issues. Migration was a hot issue, because people are, at least ini-
tially, not so much against migration. The fact is that this migration is 
not properly dealt with and it creates problems – for instance, if your 
children are in a tiny minority in a class where you, for example, have 
35 different nationalities, it’s a real problem for the parents, because 
their children are spending their time trying to adjust to the fact that 
all these other children are from different cultures instead of learning. 
There’s a lack of response from the government – maybe we should 
have specially equipped classes, etc. The same for housing – there 
was a scandal in, I think, 1982 in France, when a communist mayor 
sent bulldozers to destroy a residence, which was housing both legal 
and illegal immigrants in Paris. It was 3 days before Christmas, so 
you can imagine the response – how is it possible that a mayor could 
act in such a way? And while this was a big shock, the political class 
has not faced the consequences of these political choices. 
This example happened in 1982, but the big change since then 
has been the introduction of social media. The question that I would 
like to ask is how does social media get into the picture of the rise of 
populism? What is its role in discussing hot issues? There’s an aspect 
of anonymity as well.
Mény: It’s what I call the “uberization of politics.” The miracle 
of democracy was the combination of the democratic principle with 
the representative principle. Unfortunately, we only have one single 
word – democracy – for a huge variety, across time and space, of 
political regimes which are more or less democratic. And the entire 
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democratic system is based on mediation and representation. We are 
unable to meet all together face to face and discuss politics. We have 
to find a way of selecting some people to represent us, and the system 
has functioned for two centuries on this basis. Today, we have two 
elements that are put on the table. The first one is, which has been put 
on the table by the Italian populists, is that everybody’s equal, so the 
voice of each individual has to be the same. The Italians say uno vale 
uno [“one person – one vote” – ed.], which might be true in terms of 
political rights, but which cannot be true in terms of, for example, 
scientific knowledge. The second thing is that social media gives the 
power to the individual to express their opinion whatever it is. One 
can express any opinion, even the most awful, thanks to anonymity 
in social media. And this is a radical change in contrast with the tra-
dition of democracy, which was based on mediation, representation, 
and delegation.
And does this actually lead to the feeling that there is more of you 
in terms of when you had to meet these people face to face? If you see 
comments directed at another group or something like that and you 
feel the same way, this makes you feel like part of the silent majority, 
doesn’t it?
Mény: Well, it is a rather bizarre situation where people coagu-
late, but at the same time they don’t really exchange. It’s like a super-
position of opinions, but most of the time there is no real discussion 
and these exchanges are often limited to a few nasty words on one 
side or the other. You have thousands and millions of individuals be-
hind their screens, who can coalesce for a specific purpose at a cer-
tain point of time. For instance, you have an interesting experience 
of that during the Arab Spring revolutions, an even more interest-
ing case of the so-called Sardines1 in Italy, but you can also observe 
1 The Sardines movement is a political movement against right-wing politics of Matteo 
Salvini which began in 2019 – Ed.
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limitations of these kinds of movements, because, for example, the 
Sardines have got what they wanted, that is to object and to oppose 
Salvini, and now the movement is over. It sounds and it looks like a 
flash mob, but then what do you do with that? Every political move-
ment needs some form of institutionalization. And we have good ex-
amples of this fragility of these movements. For instance, at some 
point in time, Berlusconi in Italy was a really powerful man, but since 
he hasn’t been able to construct a true party with a philosophy, a pro-
gramme, etc., in 2 or 3 years’ time, when Berlusconi will not be able 
to participate in politics anymore or will die, it’s over. Nothing will 
remain of the Berlusconi populism.
So is populism not sustainable? It does seem that without any ac-
tual institutionalization of these movements, it’s impossible for them 
to go forward, and when they do institutionalize, they lose a little bit 
of that populist edge, because they have to become more inclusive, 
they have to act according to the laws, etc. Is a populist movement 
sustainable and is it something that we have to worry about in the 
longer-term future as democrats?
Mény: Let’s say that populism, as it presents itself in most coun-
tries is not sustainable as such. That is, the gap between promises 
and reality is even bigger than in the case of classic political parties 
and policymakers. They promise much more – for instance, take the 
case of the Cinque Stelle [Five Stars – ed.] movement in Italy, we 
are going down to the ridicule. They have been elected by 11 mil-
lion people, which were a lot, they were the main party after last 
parliamentary elections and they have consulted their followers on 
various points since they have been in government. For example, do 
we agree to form a coalition Partito Democratico [Democratic Part – 
ed.], etc. There were 40,000 votes in favour, but what does it mean? 
You are elected by 11 million people and your strategy is approved 
by 40,000 – it does not make sense. So I don’t think populism, as it 
presents itself, has a future, because it’s completely unrealistic – it’s 
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demagoguery. The other option is the integration of the movement 
into a more stable party with a more reasonable programme. In that 
case the populist movement does not become a mainstream party, 
but inserts itself into mainstream politics. Obviously, what makes a 
difference is America, because most of the populist movements have 
influence nationally, but Trump populism has influence worldwide. 
Many local populist movements feel comforted, feel protected by 
Trump’s attitude, and Trump also contributes a lot to the destruction 
of what remains of the global international institutional setting – the 
IMF, the WTO, etc. But my guess is that democracy, which has al-
ways adjusted, will incorporate some forms of populist claims, but 
populism as such always ends either in anarchy or something worse.
I would like to take a little detour from populism and ask about 
the European Union. You said that our whole order is based on the 
Westphalian model of nation-states and the politics, the idea of demo-
cracy is based on nation-states as well. Is there a possibility of a true 
supranational democracy?
Mény: Well, we have to be pragmatic, experimental and patient. 
There is a risk in saying that we need some kind of democratic solu-
tion at a supranational level, but the options are either to go back 
to the nation as before or to try to democratize processes which are 
presently out of hands of the people, of the population. So the solu-
tion would be to imagine a few elements which would give, let’s 
say, more substance to what European democracy might need. Some 
might be extremely symbolic – for example, the European Health 
Insurance Card. Most people, including myself, were not aware that 
there is a European card, which allows you to be treated without any 
expenses in any country of the European Union. It’s a huge benefit, 
but people don’t know they have this benefit. Distributing this card 
to every European citizen would be a big step, because you also need 
symbolic, tangible evidence that you belong to the community. Then 
you might say that while there are these populist demands, there is 
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also an answer in the citizen initiative in the EU Lisbon treaty, but 
in reality the citizen initiative is not working. Everything has been 
done in order to make it impossible or at least limit the possibilities to 
put forward a proposal, not even on the ballot, but also the proposal 
submitted to the commission. I would say every 5 years, at the time 
of European parliamentary elections, why not give the possibility for 
the European voters to vote on one or two initiatives? We could even 
think, initially, that these initiatives are put forward by the Parliament 
itself. We could also imagine that they are initiated from below, but I 
think that it would be a signal that the views of the people are taken 
into consideration. That will also be a way of breaking up the closure 
of the present treaties, because, in practice, the treaties as they are 
cannot be changed, because everybody has a veto and it is impossible 
to come into agreement. So the only solution, which was found with 
this financial stability mechanism, was to sign the treaty outside the 
European treaty, which is ridiculous.
For the last question now it has to be said that populism did cap-
ture the imagination of voters. Pierre Rosanvallon, for example, talks 
about how the modern democratic politics does not offer an idealistic 
and ideological view – it doesn’t give any real true ideas to voters. Is 
there anything that the modern democracy can offer to counter pop-
ulism? Is there a possibility to have something in modern democratic 
politics that really captures the imagination of the people?
Mény: Well, revolutions and revolts are always more romantic 
than the nitty-gritty of business as usual. I’m afraid that normal gov-
ernments will never be able to compete with this revolutionary ro-
mantic view of a perfect world. But, at the same time, this romanti-
cism might actually be useful for waking democracy up – we tend to 
become a little bit stagnant and fall into a routine. What is interest-
ing with democracy is that it’s both an ideal and a political system. 
The political system is trying to adjust and to run after the ideal, but 
the more you approach the ideal, the more it runs away. That’s the 
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beauty, in a way, of democracy, because fascism or Nazism or Marx-
ism all offer a kind of a ready-made, complete system. Everything is 
foreseen, everything seems to fit in very nicely. Democracy is always 
an approximation, it is never perfect and that is not only the reason 
for the crisis, but also the reason for the success. You are looking for 
an ideal which is not yet accomplished.
